Available positions multiple points per decision
Available positions using multiple points based points allocation approach
Overview
The number of positions that can be filled multiplied by a number of points, such as 10 or 100, will determine the amount of points each voter receives to allocate. This allocation approach gives voters a larger amount of expressiveness to decide how they want to allocate their points. In many funding decisions a rough estimation of the available positions would be required as each proposal could request a different amount of funding. In these situations the total budget could be divided by the average requested budget to get an estimation of the available positions.
High accuracy & expressiveness (Score - 4)
Having multiple points per available position can be effective for enabling voters to express the intensity of their preferences. Having a limited number of points based on the number of available positions could also potentially help with increasing accuracy of the decision outcome. If voters dilute their points across too many proposals this could reduce the accuracy of the decision as voters are not being forced to select and consolidate their points across the most important proposals. Multiple points per proposal would give voters much more flexibility in how they allocate their points across many proposals.
Moderate voting complexity (Score - 3)
The complexity would be slightly higher than a single point allocation approach for available positions as now the voters need to be concerned about the intensity of the preference they are expressing when allocating their points to each proposal. A benefit of this approach is that voters would receive the same voting experience in each decision.
Low voting time required (Score - 4)
The voting time would be slightly more than the single points approach for available positions as voters would need to spend more time thinking about how they want to allocate a larger number of points across the same proposals. More time and thought could likely be needed to decide how they want to allocate their points.
Moderate game theory risks (Score - 3)
This approach is using a fixed maximum allocation approach which means that the consolidation of voting power across a number of proposals would not give bad actors an increased influence if voters are also allocating the maximum points on their preferred proposals. Bad actors could benefit from voting behaviour where voters dilute their voting power by allocating their points across more proposals than there are fillable positions. Not allocating points up to the maximum limit would mean increasing the effectiveness of bad actors consolidating their voting power on their own proposals to better influence the decision outcome.
Total score = 14 / 20
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